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THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT:
REVERSE PRE-EMPTION
OR CONTRACTUAL FEDERALISM ?
John A. Duff
All along the coasts of the United States, as the lands give way to the
sea, another transition takes place as well. Federal law washes over state
law until at last, miles out to sea, federal law rules exclusively. The
dynamic natural environment contributes to the fact that land-based
activities affect the seas, and vice versa. As a result, federal law may not
adequately protect federal interests and state laws may be insufficient to
protect a state's coastal zone from activities that take place in distant
federal waters. How can government fashion a system that serves both
federal and state interests? The answer: cooperation through a partnership
contract arrangement, an option that has been employed since 1972. In an
era of increasing battles over the proper roles of federal and state power,
the Coastal Zone Management Act' (CZMA) stands as a useful example of
a vehicle that mutually benefits the federal and state governing authorities
and the areas they govern. The CZMA achieves this result under a theory
as close to contract as federalism. The CZMA provides federal funds to
states to manage their coastal areas in accordance with a set of federal
guidelines. The CZMA does not mandate state participation, but, rather,
makes the states an offer. The benefits of this cooperative or contractual
federalism relationship can be seen in the number of states that have
accepted the offer and have adopted state coastal management programs,
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which serve the dual purpose of protecting not only the coasts of the
individual states, but the entire nation's coastal zone.2
One aspect of the CZMA, the consistency provision, allows states a
voice in activities that are outside of the state territory, but which may
affect the state's coastal zone. Critics of the CZMA argue that the federal
government bargained badly in constructing the contractual nature of the
relationship and that the CZMA, or at least certain features of the cooperative federalism relationship, including the consistency provision, ought to
be abolished. In his article, The FederalConsistency Requirements of the
Coastal Zone Management Act: It's 7ime to Repeal This Fundamentally
FlawedLegislation,3 Bruce Kuhse makes an impassioned plea to eradicate
what he characterizes as a costly, burdensome, and ill-conceived instrument
in the form of the consistency provision, due to what he claims are its
reverse pre-emption effects on federal activity and authority. This brief
article is designed to address some of the arguments made by Mr. Kuhse,
to provide the reader with a different perspective on the CZMA federalstate relationship, and to posit the argument that the consistency provision
is not a cession of federal authority, but, rather, even in its limited strength,
a persuasive material element which attracts states to participate in the
system.
The FederalInterest in State CoastalWaters
Since the beginning of the Republic, the federal government has
exercised a range of authorities over activities in the nation's coastal
waters. The federal courts have plenary jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime matters.4 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution5 creates a
navigation servitude which encumbers all navigable waters of the United
States.6 Moreover, a host of federal statutes govern the maintenance and

2. See NOAA, The CoastalZone Management Program(visited Nov. 12,2000) <http:ll
www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/czm/>. Currently, 33 of the 35 coastal states and territories that
border the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes
have federally approved coastal management plans. See id. As a result, 95,331 national
shoreline miles (99.9%) are managed under CZMA guidelines. Of the remaining 108 miles
(0. 1%), 45 lie within Indiana, which is in the process of program development; the rest lies
within Illinois, which is not participating in the program. See id.
3. Bruce Kuhse, The Federal Consistency Requirements of the Coastal Zone ManagementAct: It's Time to Repeal This FundamentallyFlawedLegislation,6 OCEAN &COASTAL
L.J. 77 (2001).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
6. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (S. Ct. 1913) (stating that
the federal "right to regulate the navigation of such waters is one of the greatest of the
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protection of the condition and capacity of the nations's coastal waters.7
Even in those circumstances where neither an express constitutional
provision nor a federal statute conveys federal authority, the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that rarest ofjudicial legal authority, federal common
law, as a means of recognizing a federal interest in the nation's waters.' At
the same time, there can be no doubt that the federal government recognizes
substantial sovereign rights of each state related to their dry land, submerged lands, and coastal waters. The Submerged Lands Act9 articulates the
recognition of a state's title and right to coastal submerged land areas and
also expressly reserves certain federal authorities deemed paramount.' °
While those water-borne paramount rights allow the federal government to
pre-empt conflicting state law, that pre-emption authority decreases or
disappears as the sea gives way to the shore. Given this regime of
concurrent jurisdiction over coastal waters where federal law may reign
supreme and the coastal land where state sovereignty constitutes greater
strength, the question arises as to the best means of establishing a system
that protects the entire nation's coastal zone, including both wet and dry
areas.
That question was answered by Congress in 1972 when the CZMA
became law." Based upon recommendation of the Stratton Commission
and with the knowledge that federal authority in the coastal zone dissipated
at the water's edge, Congress enacted a law designed to persuade, rather
than mandate, the states to protect the resources of the coastal zone.'I At
the outset of the CZMA, Congress states that there is a "national interest in
the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of
the coastal zone."' 3
By its very nature, the CZMA is contractual. The states need not enter
into the partnership offered by the federal government. 4 Nor does the

powers delegated to the United States by the power to regulate commerce").
7. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-87 (1994); Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (1994 &Supp. IV 1998); Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1994); Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994);. Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-45b (1994 &Supp. IV 1998); Ocean Dumping Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (1994).
8.
See Illinoisv. City ofMilwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,103(1972) (citingTexasv. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10' Cir. 1971)).

9.

43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See!& §§ 1311(a), 1356 (1994).
Coastal Zone Management Act, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280.
See Kuhse, supra note 3 at 79.
16 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
Dr. D. James Baker, Testimony Before Subcomm. on Fisheries, Conservation,

112

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:109

federal government have to enter into a relationship with a state if it deems
the state's coastal management plan to be deficient. 5 The considerations
exchanged in the contract are cash from the federal government to the state
government in exchange for a state program designed to protect coastal
zone in accordance with federal guidelines. Simply put, the effect of the
contract is that the states get money and the federal government gets a
national system of coastal management programs that meets its basic
objectives.
The BargainingChip-Giving the States a Voice in FederalActivities
and FederalTerritory
A significant bargaining chip in the CZMA contract or partnership is
the federal consistency provision. 16 In addition to the funding provided by
the federal government, a state is effectively given a voice in federal
activities via the consistency provision. Some commentators contend that
the contractual nature of this cooperative federalism relationship, particularly the consistency provision, effectively produces a "reverse preemption" system whereby a state can effectively block the federal
government from exercising its authority. In his article advocating the
abolition of the consistency provision, Mr. Kuhse characterizes the measure
as an ill-conceived cession of authority from the federal to the state
government. The effect, contends Kuhse, amounts to a reverse pre-emption
scenario, i.e., rather than the federal government having the power to preempt state law, the state has authority to block what would otherwise be an
allowable federal activity. Kuhse's recounting of circumstances where
states have used the consistency provision as a means of influencing or
impeding federal activity is constructed to illustrate the threat that this
"negative pre-emption" poses not merely to the proposed activity at issue,
but to the very nature of federal authority itself. One reading Mr. Kuhse's
argument might be led to believe that a federal government activity or a
permitting decision related to an activity that takes place outside state

Wildlife & Oceans (visitedJan. 17,2001) <http:/resourcescomnmittee.house.gov/resourcesl
106cong/fishries/00mar28/baker.html>. "[The]Coastal Zone Management Program was
created under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. The program is a voluntary
partnership between the federal government and U.S. coastal states and territories that is
intended to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, restore and enhance the nation's
coastal resources." Id.
15. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (explaining how the federal government reviews the state
coastal program and conducts further reviews of any substantial changes or revisions to a
state program).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
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jurisdiction may be derailed by the whim of a state by the mere utterance
of the term "inconsistent." But in those circumstances where the federal
activity may impact the state's coastal zone, the state must do more than
merely object; it must articulate some rational basis for doing so. In fact,
in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against a state for failure to state a
consistency objection within the meaning of the CZMA. This decision led
17
to a congressional strengthening of the state's consistency scope.

While there is no doubt that the states have effectively blocked some

types of activity from occurring," s they have done so not in opposition to
federal authority, but with the full understanding of the federal government

and pursuant to a provision of afederal law which has been revisited and
re-authorized by Congress numerous times over the last quarter century. 19
In some instances, the consistency provision has proven to be a NEPA-like

tool that fosters sound and informed decision-making. 2

17. See Secretary of The Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (S.Ct. 1984). See also
Kuhse supra note 3 at 89.
18. See Kuhse supra note 3, at 96-98.
19. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-150; 110 Stat.
1380 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Oceans Act of 1992, Pub.
L. 102-587,106 Stat. 5039 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Coastal
Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 95-372,92 Stat. 629 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1978,
Pub. L 95-342, 92 Stat. 629 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.);
Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
20. See 65 Fed. Reg. 31,492, at 31,593 (May 18,2000). Notice of Final Rulemaking.
"When the EPA wanted to designate an ocean dumping site, it consulted Louisiana: The
30-day comment period on EPA's Final EIS closed on January 11, 1999. Only one comment
letter, from the State of Louisiana, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, Office
of Cultural Development, was received on the Final EIS. The Louisiana Office of Cultural
Development found the document to be thorough and well written, and concurred with the
evaluation that there would be no effect on significant cultural resources, and as such, had
no objections to the proposal. EPA's NEPA review included coordination with the State of
Louisiana underrequirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The State of Louisiana
concurred with EPA's determination that final designation of the Atchafalaya River Bar
Channel ODMDS is consistent, to the maximum extent practicable, with the Louisiana
Coastal Resources Program. This final rulemaking document fills the same role as the
Record of Decision required under regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality for agencies subject to NEPA." Id
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Who's Trumping Whom?
In issues of pre-emption, courts often characterize the exercise of a
superior federal power as a right to "trump," or override, a state law or
decision. Kuhse's notion of inverse pre-emption paints a picture of the
federal government giving away this trump card to the states when it comes
to matters that may affect the coastal zone of the nation. However, a more
accurate card-playing portrayal of the federal-state partnership might be a
picture of the federal government dealing a wild card to each state in
exchange for each state anteing up with a coastal zone management
program that enriches the dealer by effecting his objectives. And while
each state may play that wild card from time to time in the form of a
consistency objection, it is obvious that even that wild card may be trumped
by any number of cards that the federal government retains.
The Trump Cards That Remain in the Federal Government's Hand
While the state may hold a wild card in the form of an "inconsistency"
claim, there remain a number of trump cards in the federal government's
hand.
Exclusion
The CZMA expressly excludes federal lands from being considered
part of a state's coastal zone.2 1 As a result, activity on federal lands within
the borders of a state's coastal zone have a trump card characteristic to
them. Mr. Kuhse indicates that the exclusion provision is weakened by the
fact that a state may "claim inconsistency" for activity that takes place in
an excluded area that might have an impact beyond the excluded area and
in the state coastal zone.22 He is correct, but that does not render the
exclusion provision meaningless.23
Presidential Exemptions for Federal Activities
Another trump card exists even where a state plays its wild card in the
form of a consistency objection to a federal activity. The President may

21. See 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1). "Excluded from the coastal zone are lands the use of
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal
Government, its officers or agents." Id.
22. See Kuhse supra note 3 at 99.
23. See Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D.P.R. 1981).
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"exempt from compliance those elements of the federal agency activity...
found

. . .

to be inconsistent with an approved State program, if the

President determines that the activity is in the paramount interest of the
United States."
Secretary Override for Federal Permitting Decisions
The fact that the consistency provision can be trumped by the Secretary

of Commerce is illustrated by the numerous instances in which the
Secretary, contrary to a state claim of inconsistency, has ruled that a federal

permit issuance was in fact "consistent" under the terms of the CZMA.
Ability to Amend, Revise, or Repeal the CZMA
The ultimate trump card that the federal government retains in its hand

is its ongoing ability to amend, revise, or repeal the CZMA. Testimony
countering the argument that the CZMA, or at least its consistency

provision, constitutes an unwanted infringement on federal authority exists
in the ongoing re-authorizations of the CZMA. Each and every time the

CZMA has been re-authorized, its consistency provision has been left
intact.26

24. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (stating that the President has this option upon a written
request submitted by the Secretary of Commerce).
25. This has happened on at least eight occasions. See e.g., In the ConsistencyAppeal
of Amoco Production Company from an Objection by the Division of Governmental
Coordinationof the State ofAlaska, 1990 NOAA LEXIS 49; In the ConsistencyAppeal of
Texaco, Inc.from an Objectionby the CaliforniaCoastalCommission, 1989 NOAA LEXIS
32; In the ConsistencyAppeal of the KoreaDrilling Company, Ltd. from an Objection by
the CaliforniaCoastalCommission, 1989 NOAA LEXIS 34; In the ConsistencyAppeal of
Long Island Lighting Companyfrom an Objection by the New York Department of State,
1988 NOAA LEXIS 32; In the Consistency Appeal of Gulf Oil Corporationfrom an
Objection before the Secretary of Commerce, 1985 NOAA LEXIS 1; In the Consistency
Appeal of Southern PacificTransportationCompany to an Objection by the California
Coastal Commission, 1985 NOAA LEXIS 73; In the Consistency Appeal of Union Oil
Company Company to an Objection by the California CoastalCommission, 1984 NOAA
LEXIS 16; In the ConsistencyAppeal of Chevron U.S.A., Inc., from an Objection by the
State of Florida,1993 NOAA LEXIS 2.
26. See Pub. L. No. 89-454, Title III, § 307, as added Pub. L. No. 92-583, Oct. 27,
1972, 86 Stat. 1285 and amended Pub. L. No. 94-370, § 6, July 26, 1976, 90 Stat. 1018;
Pub. L. No. 95-372, Title V, § 504, Sept. 18, 1978,92 Stat 693; Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title
VI, § 6208, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388-307; Pub. L. No. 102-587, Title II, § 2205(b)(13),
(14) Nov. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 5051.
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Upping the Ante

In addition to the trump cards that the federal government holds, reauthorizations since 1990 illustrate that the federal government is intent on
upping the ante in terms of the conditions it is seeking to exact from the
states. Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments27 (CZARA) requires states and territories with coastal zone management programs that have received approval under section 306 of the CZMA
to develop and implement coastal nonpoint source pollution control
programs.28 Coastal states and territories were required to submit their
coastal nonpoint programs to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for approval by July 1995. Fulfilling their part of the contract, a
number of states and territories have submitted coastal nonpoint programs
satisfying the requirement. 9

27. Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments are codified
under 16 U.S.C. § 1455b. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b was enacted as part of the Coastal Zone Act
Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, and not as part of the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455b. "Not later than 30 months after the date of the publication
of final guidance under subsection (g) of this section, each State for which a management
program has been approved pursuant to section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972 [16 USC § 1455] shall prepare and submit to the Secretary and the Administrator
a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program for approval pursuant to this section. The
purpose of the program shall be to develop and implement management measures for
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters, working in close conjunction
with other State and local authorities." Id. at 1455b(a)(1).
29. See e.g., Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program: Approval Decision on
Puerto Rico Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,703 (9/5/2000).
"Notice is hereby given of the intent to fully approve the Puerto Rico Coastal Nonpoint
Pollution Control Program (coastal nonpoint program) and of the availability of the draft
Approval Decisions on conditions for the Puerto Rico coastal nonpoint program ...NOAA
and EPA conditionally approved the Puerto Rico coastal nonpoint program on November
18, 1997. NOAA and EPA have drafted approval decisions describing how Puerto Rico has
satisfied the conditions placed on its program and therefore has a fully approved coastal
nonpoint program." Id.; Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program: Approval Decision
on California Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,311 (51/2000)
"Notice is hereby given of the intent to fully approve the California Coastal Nonpoint
Pollution Control Program (coastal nonpoint program) and of the availability of the draft
Approval Decisions on conditions for the Caifomia coastal nonpoint program.... NOAA
and EPA have drafted approval decisions describing how California has satisfied the
conditions placed on its program and therefore has a fully approved coastal nonpoint
program." Id.; Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program: Approval Decision on Rhode
Island Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,543 (3/17/2000).
"Notice is hereby given of the intent to fully approve the Rhode Island Coastal Nonpoint
Pollution Control Program (coastal nonpoint program) and of the availability of the draft
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The fact that the federal government continues to play the game and
raise the stakes suggests that it is willing to leave its own contribution, visa-vis the consistency provision, intact. In light of its growing reliance on
states to develop more extensive coastal management programs with
increasing responsibilities, it is unlikely that the federal government wishes
to eliminate its allowance for states to have a voice in federal activities and
permitting decisions that may affect their coasts
Conclusion
When the notion of reverse pre-emption, as posited by Mr. Kuhse, is
considered in the context of the CZMA, it is important to remember that the
federal government cannot be absolutely bound by the states in any real
ongoing way. In the CZMA contractual federalism card game, the federal
government convened the game, wrote the rules, holds a number of trump
cards, and has the ability to end the game when it wishes. The consistency
provision that gives states a voice that they would otherwise not have does
not threaten federal authority. In its worst manifestation it amounts to
nothing more than a wild card that might be played by the state. The fact
that on some occasions the federal government allows the state's wild card
to go untrumped does not mean that the federal government is powerless.
Rather in those circumstances, it may be better characterized that the
federal government allows a state to benefit from the bargain struck in the
CZMA federal-state contract partnership. There is likely no doubt that in
some of the situations Mr. Kuhse cites, certain individuals have borne a
greater burden than may have been anticipated. However, a distinction
should be drawn between the limited situations in which these arguable
inequities occur and the overall nature of contractual federalism embodied
in the CZMA regime. There may be remedies to addressing the seemingly
unfair circumstances that may result under a state's claim of "inconsistency.' 30 But a balancing of the bargaining chips seems to indicate that
states might drop out of the bargain if one of the biggest chips is taken out

Approval Decisions on conditions for the Rhode Island coastal nonpoint program. NOAA
and EPA conditionally approved the Rhode Island coastal nonpoint program on September
27, 1997. NOAA and EPA have drafted approval decisions describing how Rhode Island

has satisfied the conditions placed on its program and therefore has a fully approved coastal
nonpoint program." ld.
30. A recent Supreme Court decision indicates that the U.S. federal government may
have to increase its financial contribution to the CZMA process in the form of payments
back to prospective federal permittees whose development proposals have been thwarted by,
among other things, state CZMA consistency objections. See Mobil Oil Exploration &
ProducingSoutheast, Inc. v. U.S., 120 S. Ct. 2423 (2000).
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of the pot. And in light of recent efforts of Congress to raise the stakes in
the game, by requiring, for example that states implement non-point source
pollution control management systems, it seems even more inequitable for
the federal government to reduce its contribution to the partnership. While
the 106' Congress struggled to construct budgets to fund federal programs,
it became clear that the legislative and executive branches agreed that the
CZMA ought to continue to receive substantial federal financial support to
assist states in administering their respective coastal management pro3
grams. 1

31. See Act of November 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, (113 Stat. 1501).
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2000: An Act Making consolidated
appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes;
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS,
RESEARCH, AND FACILITIES (INCLUDING TRANSFERS OF FUNDS) : grants to
States pursuant to sections 306 and 306A of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as
amended, shall not exceed $2,000,000; COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT FUND: Of
amounts collected pursuant to section 308 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16
U.S.C. 1456(a), not to exceed $4,000,000, for the purposes set forth in sections 308(b)(2)
(A), 308(b)(2)(B)(v), and 315(e) of such Act. Id. See also Act of December 21, 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-553, (114 Stat. 2762) (H.R. 4942). "That of the funds provided under this
heading for ocean and coastal conservation programs, $10,000,000 is available for
implementation of State nonpoint pollution control plans established pursuant to section
6217 of the Coastal Zone Management act of 1972, as amended by P.L. No. 101-508." ld.
at 167.

